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Part VIII
Conclusion
Lessons for thinking about war

Every age has its own kind of war with its own peculiarities. War’s nature 
may be enduring; its character is prone to change – in each era as well as 
in each encounter. Ours is a time of considerable, some argue accelerating, 
societal, economic, political, and technological change. Accelerating or not, 
this megatrend of change permeates almost all walks of human life: how we 
live and communicate, how we work and collaborate, how we interact and 
create, and, to a large degree, how we fight. It thus affects how we prepare, 
equip, and organise for war as well as how we conduct war. Contemporary 
war continues to be characterised by the three enduring elements of kinetic 
activity, connectivity, and the symbiotic relationship between the human 
and the synthetic. The overarching theme that emerges from the contribu-
tions to this volume is the fact that across all three elements there has been 
considerable change over the past two decades.
The democratisation of kinetic means, traditional 
and non-traditional
On the kinetic front, a key trend has been the dissipation of power and the 
democratisation of violence. Put simply, the Davids of this world stand a 
better chance against the Goliaths. Insurgencies are proving to be remark-
ably robust confronted with ostensibly superior firepower in various con-
flict zones around the world. Beyond any doubt, in the past Western armed 
forces often faced difficulties in the fight against non-state adversaries. To-
day’s non-state actors, however, prove to be increasingly capable of chal-
lenging ostensibly much stronger powers. In the 2010s IS showed how violent 
groups are able to punch above their initially purported weight. IS’ ruth-
less exploitation of synthetic and connected elements allowed it to  generate 
kinetic effects at a regional and even global level, greatly enhancing its resil-
ience to withstand external attacks. The perseverance of other groups such 
as Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabaab, and Boko Haram – which were all targeted in 
 extensive military campaigns – illustrates the levelling of the playing field 
between violent state and violent non-state actors. In the context of renewed 
confrontation between major military powers, violent non-state actors also 
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serve as puppets and proxies in increased grey zone competition. Russia’s 
ties to the Donbass People’s Militia in Eastern Ukraine, Iran’s Quds Force’s 
orchestration of Hezbollah fighters in Iraq and Syria, Egypt’s – as well as 
rich Gulf states’ – support for Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army in 
Libya may well be harbingers of what the 2020s will bring.
This all concurs with a more general trend of a changing balance of power 
between major and lesser military powers. These now have military capabil-
ities at their disposal that allow them to level the playing field in a way that 
was unthinkable only a generation ago. Advanced C4ISR as well as military 
standoff capabilities are no longer the prerogative of Western powers alone. 
Low and high tech unmanned (weapon) systems are starting to be deployed 
by many conflict actors in the air and on land. Western military powers may 
still enjoy tactical military dominance, but Western military supremacy is 
no longer. Tactical excellence and operational craftmanship notwithstand-
ing, strategic proficiency has been in short supply for an extended period of 
time now. Political leaders, especially, have performed poorly when it comes 
to formulating clear but also realistic political objectives, and allocating the 
required means to achieve these objectives. Other state actors have arguably 
proven to be more agile and more adept, both in terms of their ability to 
set coherent strategic objectives, match these with the required means, and 
to follow through on them, and in terms of their ability to adapt and inno-
vate. A general disinclination prevalent in Western polities to engage with 
the messy and bloody realities of war based on a declining willingness to 
fight in postmodern societies has been further fed by close to two decades of 
few strategic successes in missions that yielded even fewer tangible benefits. 
This, in combination with steady technological progress in unmanned sys-
tems since the early 2000s, has resulted in greater emphasis on a new form of 
risk management from above and from afar, typically in collaboration with 
local proxy actors and spearheaded by small contingents of special forces, 
giving another dimension to the function of security force assistance. Such 
forms of risk management, variously indicated with terms as remote, sur-
rogate, or liquid warfare, have become more prevalent over the past period 
amidst increasing geopolitical tensions. They are replacing the emphasis on 
counterinsurgency (COIN) and stabilisation missions of the aughts. It is far 
from certain that the valuable lessons learned during these missions will not 
be forgotten in a repetition of the strategic amnesia of the lessons painstak-
ingly learned from counterinsurgencies in the past.
The exploitation of novel forms of kinesis
Meanwhile, new forms of kinesis – means and ways to exert pressure 
– have progressively materialised. The global wiring of our world of the 
past quarter century has paved the way for unprecedented global connec-
tivity, alongside introducing a range of economic and social opportunities 
but also critical vulnerabilities that soon started to be exploited for malign 
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purposes. The existence of these vulnerabilities was identified by futurists 
and by military professionals already in the 1990s. The 2000s saw cautious 
experimentation with incidental, some would say audacious, endeavours in 
the latter half of that decade. But it was not until the 2010s that these were 
followed up with more serious large scale development of capabilities, strat-
egies, and tactics deployed in real world operations, which are now taking 
off. A number of high profile cyber operations on but certainly also off the 
battlefield with considerable strategic impact showcased to all participants 
the tactical and strategic effects, if also the risks and limitations, associated 
with action in this new domain. The deployment of cyber instruments, alone 
or in combination with kinetic instruments, is now increasingly becoming 
the norm. For every pundit that argues this is a brave new world, there is a 
traditionalist arguing precisely the opposite. Be that as it may, international 
legal scholars and practitioners see themselves forced to reflect on the rein-
terpretation and possible adjustment of the rules and regulations guiding 
behaviour in bello, ad bello, and extra bello.
Political warfare in a connected world
The virtual arteries traversing our digitally connected societies have opened 
up a cloud of new possibilities to exert influence in the information realm. 
Traditional tricks of the political warfare trade are being applied to great 
effect, albeit in thoroughly modernised guises. The viral nature of infor-
mation flows in social networks is exploited by shrewd conflict actors. The 
battle of the narrative in conflict theatres has given way to the emergence of 
widespread meddling in societal discourses in peacetime. In hindsight, the 
CNN effect of the 1990s pales in comparison to the effects of manipulated 
messages flowing through billions of people’s Facebook or Weibo feeds. 
The echoes of these social media chambers expose a much more vulnerable 
cauldron than most political scientists and sociologists anticipated prior to 
the widespread adoption of these platforms over the past decade. The ma-
nipulation of societal discourses is nothing new and has been practiced by 
Western and non-Western powers alike – long before it started to be am-
ply documented during the Cold War. Its sheer scale and impact, however, 
have become a pernicious problem that all actors, regardless of their regime 
type, are grappling with. Military commanders and their political leaders 
must now, certainly more than before, consider how citizen journalists or 
hostile state actors report on military operations, and anticipate how infor-
mation will be faked, tweaked, and manipulated by adversaries. In the early 
stages of a conflict or confrontation, disinformation is often used to seize 
the  initiative in the battle for the narrative. When a conflict continues for an 
extended period of time, a general sense of fatigue with a particular cause 
can creep in. This may result in a wish to move on to other things. Accu-
mulating effects are difficult to differentiate from fatigue with a particular 
cause, but it is becoming clear that being first with the truth, deploying mass 
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in the scale of messaging, and being determined to see things through can 
win or lose a key narrative.
The effect of new propagandistic means on the conduct of war itself is 
certainly non-negligible either. The manipulation of information has be-
come part and parcel of military operations across the globe once again 
implying that the truth is the first casualty of war. Western and non-Western 
military organisations have set up entire information manoeuvre units to 
pro-actively shape the information sphere in recognition of their vital role in 
compelling adversaries to change their minds. Russia’s endeavours on this 
front certainly inspired others to copy and imitate. But the success of non-
state actors and their ability to rally support, recruit adherents, and attract 
finance certainly also played a role. Information operations expanded not 
just the reach of non-state actors in the virtual realm but also their sheer 
prowess to project power in the physical realm. IS’ rise in the 2010s and its 
tenacious tenure before it was defeated, at least in its conventional force 
incarnation, provided concrete corroboration of the risks posed by decen-
tralised, distributed networks.
The impact of legal lawfare
Meanwhile, the term legal lawfare has been coined to describe contempo-
rary conflict behaviour. This represents conceptual over-stretch to some 
who hold that war in its essence is about the organised use of violence in 
pursuit of political goals. Yet, the extensive legal corpus guiding the conduct 
of war, which has been spun since the days of Cicero and has been adjusted 
but also strengthened especially since the early 20th century, is now used 
and abused by state and non-state actors, both outside but also within the 
more traditional notion of war. Outside war, state actors seek to remain 
below the threshold of war and refrain from declaring war, leading to the 
pervasiveness of so called hybrid conflict, grey zone confrontation, strate-
gic coercion or, in a more recent designation, liminal warfare. Inside war, 
there is an increasing salience of conflict actors seeking to gain tactical and 
strategic advantage over their opponents that try and abide by the laws of 
war through the positioning of military assets in the proximity of civilian 
facilities to induce violations and through the framing and distribution of 
the news of real or fabricated violations through media channels.
Vicious dynamics of renewed great power confrontation
Amid all the confusion about the impact of new domains on war, and heated 
debate about the analytical value of new nomenclature to capture changes in 
its character, great power competition and conflict have re-emerged. Start-
ing in the early 2010s, established – (United States), emerging – (China), 
and resurgent powers (Russia) embarked on large scale military modern-
isation programmes with other states following suit. These major powers 
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are since prioritising not just the refurbishment of their conventional mili-
tary capabilities but also seek to gain incremental as well as a punctuated 
strategic-military edge through investment in potentially more disruptive 
or enabling technologies, including Artificial Intelligence (AI). They are 
gearing up for renewed peer competitor conflict with the renewal of their 
nuclear arsenals, a shift to more aggressive nuclear postures, the develop-
ment and deployment of a new generation of hypersonic delivery vehicles, 
and renewed attention to the militarisation of space. Meanwhile, frequent 
military aerial intrusions of national sovereign airspaces as well as gunboat 
diplomacy have become a regular recurrence in major powers’ attempts to 
carve out and reconfirm spheres of influence, which is further driving a vi-
cious cycle of military competition that in the 2010s did not escalate into 
direct major power conflict.
Incremental change: Machine learning in military operations
On the synthetic front, the explosion of computing power and the devel-
opment of hardware (coincidentally as a side effect of a booming global 
gaming industry which spurred progress in graphical processing units’ 
power) paved the way for rapid advances in machine learning (ML) from 
2011 onwards. Military organisations were certainly not amongst the early 
adaptors, but confronted with the tremendous value created in industries as 
varied as trading and investment, advertising, and medicine, they started 
stepping up their efforts in the second half of the 2010s. They formulated 
plans, allocated considerable budgets, and started experimenting with the 
integration of ML applications in standing operations including in monitor-
ing and detection, target acquisition, navigation, and logistics. Thus far, this 
is leading to incremental progress predominantly through the faster pro-
cessing and analysis of ever greater amounts of information. The constant 
flow of information through ubiquitous surveillance capabilities is forcing 
the adaptation of command and control structures. ML has furthermore 
boosted the navigation abilities of semi-autonomous systems, and has made 
the enormously complicated and costly logistics required for fielding mod-
ern armed forces more efficient. It is, albeit slowly, contributing to shorter 
OODA loops, along different elements of that chain, and promises to change 
the economics of force generation in the future.
The role of the synthetic – in reality, not in science fiction
Hyper war remains at the horizon for now, but accelerated war is already a 
reality. In that sense, the 2010s have shown us glimpses of what AI enabled 
war can look like. Images of a dystopian future in which robots have taken 
over remain science fiction for the time being, but early manifestations of 
AI enabled war are definitely visible. In that vein, All Domain Operations 
is still a future concept but joint operations, enabled increasingly by more 
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advanced technologies, are integral to contemporary warfare. Similarly, mo-
saic warfare is still being funded by the Defense Advanced Research  Projects 
Agency (DARPA) as an aspirational concept, but networked and distrib-
uted warfare have become a reality. In sum, the aspirations of the 1990s of 
informationised war materialised in the 2010s, whereas the intelligentised 
battlefield as envisioned by the Chinese remains an aspiration to be imagi-
neered in the decade(s) to come. Overall, the synthetic – the artificial and the 
manufactured – has been making further inroads into the ways in which vi-
olence is wielded in the pursuit of political objectives both as an enabler and 
as an effector. The synthetic has only done so, however, as an extension of the 
human, which continues to give it shape and direction, but the combination 
of the synthetic and the human is giving birth to new ways of war.1 In other 
words, while synthetics greatly enhance the ability to deliver pressure, resist 
threats, and even command, it is the human who remains in control.
The development of new grammars for war
During this period of considerable change, strategists grapple with the ad-
aptation of time tested strategic concepts to the challenges posed by today’s 
conflict environment, and consider how 19th- and 20th-century strategic 
concepts such as centre of gravity and deterrence can be tweaked, expanded, 
and refined to be brought to bear in this domain. The heated debates are not 
only testament to the explosion of information exchange in a globally con-
nected world. They are also emblematic of the fact that the grammar of war 
defined as the principles, rules, and procedures that govern the use of force 
in new domains, as well as how it can contribute to its overarching logic, is 
being reinvented.
The idea of a logic in war has long been contested, but in our current 
context, what is discernible is a renewed sense of the utility of armed force 
in the service of political objectives. E. H. Carr, the British historian, noted 
that it is always hard to perceive the major shifts in the period in which you 
are living. The sheer flux of events and changes often obscure the trends, 
and we are, to cite Hegel, always wise after the event. Many political scien-
tists discern a decline in war which began in 1945, at the same time as many 
social scientists maintain that violent conflict has seeped down from states 
into societies. Strategic thinkers, meanwhile, are concerned that major con-
ventional wars may not be obsolete at all, and they see all the indicators of 
more serious, high-intensity, extremely lethal struggles ahead.
The grammar of war, too, is difficult to nail down to a single essence or 
character. In the case of extremist groups like IS, its atrocities suggested 
an inclination for the application of overwhelming and unlimited force. 
Western militaries, by contrast, relied on air supremacy, aerial surveillance 
instruments, and precise weapon systems to limit their interventions to 
the least destructive possible without jeopardising their objectives. Russia 
and China have adopted different grammars of their own – using force as 
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leverage, intimidation, and the breaking of international norms, including 
the use of violent proxies. Which of these constitute the grammar or char-
acter of the early 21st century? The answer is surely that they all do: war is 
protean. Its form is certainly significant but so are its purpose and essence 
which in the end dictate its logic.
Change and continuity in the character of war
In the study of war, scholars tend to focus on the eternal and the constant, 
whereas futurists and technologists tend to focus on the transformational 
and the novel. The former tend to be of the opinion that the more changes, 
the more remains the same. The latter tend to find that radical change is 
 always around the corner. The truth, perhaps, lies somewhere betwixt and 
between. Many overestimate the impact of the rate of change in the short 
term, but underestimate it in the longer term. However, when the future 
finally arrives, they quickly adjust, and accept the state of affairs as norma-
tive. This is simply because the many iterations and developments in war’s 
conduct accumulate into the present. Philosophically, the future that was 
imagined back in the days of J.F.C. Fuller has happened. He maintained 
that the conduct of war could be understood as control, pressure, and re-
sistance. Such a broad categorisation allowed him to incorporate a variety 
of developments, and yet still conceive of how a war could or would be con-
ducted. We can be sure, as Fuller was, that wars will happen in the decades 
that lie ahead. Wars will be defined by setbacks and successes, by frustrat-
ing friction, by human failures, technological breakdowns as well as break-
throughs, and all that thousands of years of human history has informed us 
is unchanging in war’s nature.
The conclusion of our volume is therefore that we should neither exag-
gerate the transformational changes in the character of war nor downplay 
the extent to which elements in the character of war have in fact changed, 
even if these were largely evolutionary rather than revolutionary. Certainly 
many aspects remain the same and endure: war continues to be about the 
organised use of violence in the pursuit of political objectives; it continues 
to generate the passions and emotions of people of flesh and blood; and 
it continues to be characterised by uncertainty and friction. The world of 
war, lest we forget, is expansive and diverse. Polities in different geographi-
cal regions find themselves along varying developmental trajectories which 
shapes why and how they wage their wars. Local level armed conflict over 
access to water and land in sub Sahara Africa contrasts with the interna-
tionalised  intrastate conflicts over larger geopolitical interests in the Middle 
East. These are, in turn, distinct from Russia’s war with Ukraine.
Our volume, we hope, has made clear that, over the past two decades, 
increased connectivity and the emergence of new synthetic elements have 
shaped old forms and created new forms of kinesis. This process has fun-
damentally impacted the way wars – both low tech and high tech and high 
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intensity and low intensity – are fought across the globe. In the context 
of these three elements our volume shows that war, in the first decades 
of the 21st century, continues to be a fundamentally political endeavour. 
 Developments along the kinesis-connectivity-synthesis trinity provide a 
good baseline to understand likely future trajectories in how humans wage 
future wars.
Note
 1 This is in line with the etymological origins of the term arms which strays back 
to the Proto-Indo-German root -Ar, which means ‘to fit together’, suggesting 
that arms can also be conceptualised as a way of joining the human with the arti-
ficial. That, in turn, can be etymologically associated with the roots of synthetic 
deriving from the Ancient Greek meaning of the term synthetikos (συνθετικός) 
which stands for a composition based on ‘putting something together’. If noth-
ing else, it illustrates that tools and technology depend on how they are put to 
use by humans.
